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LEVERAGING BIAS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 
Roger Koppl*F 
 A Response to Simon A. Cole, Acculturating 
Forensic Science: What Is ‘Scientific Culture’, 
and How Can Forensic Science Adopt It?, 38 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 435 (2010). 
 
Dr. Simon Cole calls for a more hierarchical 
organization of forensic science in his 
challenging Article, Acculturating Forensic 
Science: What is ‘Scientific Culture’, and How can 
Forensic Science Adopt it?1  I think Dr. Cole is 
right to say that there are different roles in 
forensic science, but somewhat mistaken in his 
call for hierarchy. 
Dr. Cole points out that the term “forensic 
science” covers a variety of activities that may 
require rather different skills.  He divides 
forensic science into five groups of activities: 
(1) basic research, (2) evidence collection, (3) 
technical management, (4) analysis, and (5) 
interpretation.2  He associates each group of 
activities with a different set of epistemic 
virtues.  Basic researchers, for example, should 
“innovate” and “subject their innovations to 
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 1. Simon Cole, Acculturating Forensic Science: What is 
‘Scientific Culture’, and How Can Forensic Science Adopt It?, 
38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 435, 468 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 454-57. 
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rigorous scrutiny.”3  By contrast, analysts (bench 
examiners) should be “careful, meticulous, and 
honest.”4 
Dr. Cole calls for “hierarchy” to empower basic 
researchers to make decisions that must be obeyed 
during the examination and interpretation of 
forensic evidence.5  The best available option, 
Dr. Cole says, is “a ‘hierarchical’ model in which 
a ‘knowledge elite’ of researchers exerts control 
over practitioners.”6  Thus, Dr. Cole has not 
chosen an inappropriate or misleading term for his 
desired outcome.  He really is calling for a 
genuine hierarchy that would empower an “elite” 
group within the general field.  Medicine is the 
model.  The medical profession has been organized 
hierarchically such that an elite of basic 
researchers controls the actions of practitioners.  
Dr. Cole thinks medicine is a good model in part 
because “society is reasonably content with the 
hierarchical model in medicine.”7 
The bare bones of the argument, then, seem to be 
that medicine is working pretty well and it is 
hierarchical.  Knowledge cascades down from the 
research elite to practicing physicians.  
Similarly, forensic science should ensure that 
bench examiners do only what the knowledge elite 
allows.  This division of intellectual labor will 
help to ensure that no bench examiner uses 
unreliable and perhaps improvised techniques.  
Presumably, some of the “research” in the Kirk 
Turner case provides an extreme example of what 
Dr. Cole wishes to prevent.8 
 
 
 3. Id. at 457. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 468-69. 
 6. Id. at 468. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Joseph Neff, Agents’ Secrets: Bloodstain Pattern 
Evidence, NEWOBSERVER.COM, http://video.newsobserver.videos.vmix 
core.com/vmix_hosted_apps/p/media?id=17182298&item_index=1&ge
nre_id=1153&sort=NULL (last visited Dec. 29, 2011). 
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I like much of Dr. Cole’s analysis, including 
his emphasis on the division of labor within 
forensic science.  But, his call for hierarchy 
misses the mark, and he exaggerates both the 
degree of hierarchy in medicine and the quality of 
medical research.  I will take up the example of 
medical research first and then discuss hierarchy 
in forensic science.  My criticism of Dr. Cole’s 
reform proposal does not imply that his analyses 
of infirmities in forensic science are equally 
flawed.  On the contrary, I have learned a great 
deal from Dr. Cole and his co-authors, whose work 
I admire greatly.  Dr. Cole has done important 
work in showing that forensic science, especially 
fingerprint analysis, is less reliable and less 
grounded in sound research than either its 
practitioners or the general public might have 
imagined.  He has chronicled errors and explained 
how the universal cognitive architecture of humans 
can lead forensic scientists astray.  But, to 
borrow Dr. Cole’s medical analogy, diagnosis and 
therapy are not the same.  I recognize and admire 
Dr. Cole’s diagnostic skills even as I challenge 
the wisdom of his therapeutic advice. 
I.  MEDICINE 
A. Who Chose the Current System? 
I confess to some perplexity at Dr. Cole’s claim 
that “society is reasonably content with the 
hierarchical model in medicine.”9  In what sense?   
Has “society” somehow surveyed the alternatives 
and chosen the current system as the least-worst 
option?  The current system is not the product of 
any rational choice, even though the conflicting 
individual choices that led, higgledy-piggledy, to 
the current system may have all been perfectly 
“rational” in some sense. 
 
 9. Cole, supra note 1, at 468. 
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The organization of the market for health care, 
like the organization of most markets, is a 
product of the shifting politics of interest 
groups.  Economists are nearly unanimous, for 
example, in the view that licensing restrictions 
in medicine have served physicians better than 
patients,10 and many view the existing restrictions 
as mostly a sop to the special interests of the 
American Medical Association (AMA).11 As the 
economic theory of “public choice” teaches, 
elected officials in a representative democracy 
have an incentive to concentrate benefits and 
disperse costs.12  The contest of interests often 
produces a “system” that is not systematic at all.  
Understanding what the system is, who is 
benefitting, and so on requires more time than 
most voters can reasonably invest.  Voters are 
“rationally ignorant” about the system, which 
makes it easier for the game to continue.  I do 
not mean to deny that ideology and high principle 
also influence outcomes.  I mean only to deny that 
the existence of a system implies that voters have 
somehow chosen the system or approved it. 
B. How Hierarchical Is Medicine? 
Dr. Cole identifies a “knowledge elite” in 
medicine, consisting of a group of researchers 
that “exerts control over practitioners.”13  “These 
researchers are engaged in basic research and the 
production of knowledge about the natural world. 
They may never see patients, never have seen a 
patient since medical school . . . or (in the case 
of Ph.D.'s) never have seen a patient at all.”14  
Below this group of “biomedical researchers” are 
 
 10. See Shirley Svorny, Licensing Doctors: Do Economists 
Agree?, 1 ECON J. WATCH 219, 285-89 (2004) (citations omitted). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See 3 JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962), reprinted in 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES M. BUCHANAN 146-48 (1999). 
 13. Cole, supra note 1, at 468. 
 14. Id. at 464. 
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the “clinical physicians.”15  Members of this 
second group “need not . . . perform research 
themselves or even be competent to perform 
research.”16  Dr. Cole does not indicate how much 
of an overlap might exist between these two 
groups.  But the supposed gold standard in medical 
research, the double-blind clinical trial, 
requires working with real human patients.  
Moreover, clinical practice does give rise to 
contributions to the literature in medical 
science.  THE LANCET regularly runs articles under 
the heading “case report.”  A recent issue (15-21 
October 2011) has a “case report” on the diagnosis 
of a cervical lump in a forty-four year-old 
Moroccan man.17  It draws general inferences, 
including the importance of considering the 
geographical origins of patients.18  The same issue 
of THE LANCET has several “cohort studies,” in 
which a group receives medical treatment (or 
shares some condition) and long-term outcomes are 
chronicled.  Picking one at random, I find that 
two of the co-authors performed surgery on 90% of 
the cohort.19  Thus, medical practice and medical 
research are more mingled than Dr. Cole seems to 
suggest. 
Although practice and “discovery science” may be 
more mixed than Dr. Cole suggests, some writers 
lament the gap between them.  Persell et al., for 
example, note that patients may present 
combinations of conditions not represented in the 
research of the randomized controlled studies of 
medicine’s “knowledge elite.”20  In their study of 
 
 15. Id. at 464-65. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Alexander D. Coronet et al., Cervical Lump? The Clue 
Is in the Hotspot, 378 LANCET 1438, 1438 (2011). 
 18. See id. 
 19. See Jane de Tsi et al., The Long-Term Outcome of Adult 
Epilepsy Surgery, Patterns of Seizure Remission, and Relapse: 
A Cohort Study, 378 LANCET 1388, 1388 (2011). 
 20. See Stephen D. Persell, M.D., et al., Frequency of 
Inappropriate Medical Exceptions to Quality Measures, 152 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 225, 228 (2010) (“[P]ractice guidelines have 
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clinicians, Persell et al. found that deviation 
from “guideline-recommended care” was “valid most 
of the time.”21  Tonelli draws the inference from 
this study and others that “[t]here is no 
hierarchy of medical knowledge or medical evidence 
for clinical practice.”22  Tonelli exemplifies a 
literature that resists the very hierarchy of 
evidence-based medicine that Dr. Cole celebrates. 
I do not know whether the critics of evidence-
based medicine exaggerate the talents of 
clinicians.  Two inferences from this literature 
seem reasonably safe, however.  First, the 
hierarchical model of medicine does not enjoy 
universal acclaim or even acceptance.  Second, 
medical practitioners can and do exercise judgment 
in applying the protocols and guidelines handed 
down from the knowledge elite of medicine.  This 
role of judgment in medicine may be good or bad.  
It may or may not be desirable that bench 
examiners in crime labs exercise a similar 
judgment.  In any event, however, medicine does 
not seem to be as good a model for Dr. Cole’s 
desired system as he seems to suggest. 
C. How Good Is Medical Research? 
Whether or not “society is reasonably content 
with the hierarchical model in medicine,”23 we may 
ask whether society should be.  Is medical 
research in this country (and elsewhere) all that 
good?  Unfortunately, medical research is probably 
not as good as we might have imagined. 
 
 
been criticized because the[ir] recommendations may be 
inappropriate for individual patients or because they may 
create undue burden for patients with many medical 
problems.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Mark R. Tonelli, Integrating Clinical Research into 
Clinical Decision Making, 47 ANN. IST. SUPER. SANITÀ 26, 29 
(2011) (It.). 
 23. Cole, supra note 1, at 468 (emphasis added). 
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Douglas A. Altman says “[t]here is considerable 
evidence that many published reports of randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs) are poor or even wrong, 
despite their clear importance.”24  He lists seven 
widespread problems including “[n]ot reporting an 
adequate method for generating random numbers” and 
“[i]nadequate information on harmful consequences 
of interventions.”25  Berger, Matthews, & Grosch 
give three examples in which experimental 
precautions against observer effects are 
compromised by “inappropriate yet regimented 
research methods.”26  In the most striking of the 
three examples, “run-in bias” is created by 
deleting adverse events prior to randomization.27  
“In randomized treatment trials,” they explain, 
“it is common to pre-treat the patients with the 
active treatment, evaluate their outcomes, and 
determine which patients to randomize based upon 
those outcomes.  Bad outcomes (even deaths) prior 
to randomization do not make it into the analysis 
and do not count against the active treatment 
under scrutiny.”28 
John P.A. Ioannidis explains why “most current 
published research findings are false.”29  I have 
reviewed his argument more carefully elsewhere.30  
The essence of his finding, however, is fairly 
straightforward.  If many researchers are 
confident that, for example, sunspots cause 
 
 24. Douglas C. Altman, Poor Quality Medical Research: What 
Can Journals Do?, 287 JAMA 2765, 2765 (2002) (citations 
omitted). 
 25. Id. at 2766. 
 26. Vance W. Berger et al., On Improving Research 
Methodology in Clinical Trials, 17 STAT. METHODS MED. RES. 231, 
231 (2008). 
 27. Id. at 234-35. 
 28. Id. at 234. 
 29. John P.A. Ioannidis, Why most Published Research 
Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED. 0696, 0696 (2005), available 
at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2 
Fjournal.pmed.0020124. 
 30. See Roger Koppl, The Social Construction of Expertise, 
47 SOC’Y  220, 222 (2010). 
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baldness, there will be many studies examining 
this relationship.  The few studies that generate 
a positive result by chance will be published.  
Sincere and honest researchers who get negative 
results may innocently cast about for reasons to 
doubt their own findings.  Rather than attempting 
to publish the negative result, they search the 
space of regression equations, adding and dropping 
regressors, discarding “outliers,” and so forth.  
If the search chances upon the “right” combination 
to generate a positive result, the researcher will 
be rewarded with a well-cited publication that 
strengthens the growing evidence for a link 
between sunspots and baldness.  “The probability 
that at least one study, among several done on the 
same question, claims a statistically significant 
research finding,” grows as the number of such 
studies grows.31  Ioannidis says that “[t]he 
greater the number . . . of tested relationships 
in a scientific field, the less likely the 
research findings are to be true.”32  And, “[t]he 
greater the flexibility in designs, definitions, 
outcomes, and analytical modes in a scientific 
field, the less likely the research findings are 
to be true.”33 
The poor quality of medical research is 
reflected in the regular reversal of past results.  
Recently, for example, a well-publicized study has 
overturned the previous wisdom that vitamin E 
reduces the risk of prostate cancer in men.34 
D. What About Outcomes? 
The infirmities of biomedical research might 
matter less if patient outcomes were better.  
 
 31. See Ioannidis, supra note 29, at 0697. 
 32. Id. at 0698. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Vitamin E No Panacea for Prostate Cancer, S. DIEGO 
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Unfortunately, the evidence suggests that modern 
medicine has relatively modest benefits in 
supporting patient outcomes. 
Adverse events are relatively common.  Brennan 
et al. found that at least 3.2% of hospital 
admissions in the U.S. result in errors that 
either prolong admission or produce a disability 
at the time of discharge.35  Andrews et al. found a 
much higher rate of 17.7%.36  One study found the 
rate of adverse drug events during hospitalization 
to be 4.2%.37  A more recent study found a rate of 
at least 8%.38  Adverse events are rather serious 
and were measured only in the hospital in the 
studies I have cited.  Presumably, other cases of 
poor outcomes from medical practice occur in 
relatively high rates as well. 
Hanson reviews evidence that medical care and 
expenses are not strongly correlated with health 
outcomes.39  The Rand study seems to have been the 
only randomized controlled study of the 
relationship between healthcare expenditures and 
healthcare outcomes.40  The study randomly assigned 
 
 35. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse 
Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of 
the Harvard Medical Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 
370 (1991). 
 36. See Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative Strategy for 
Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309, 309 
(1997). 
 37. See Bonnie L. Senst et al., Practical Approach to 
Determining Costs and Frequency of Adverse Drug Events in a 
Health Care Network, 58 AM. J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY 1126, 1129 
(2001). 
 38. See Mark L. Metersky et al., Racial Disparities in the 
Frequency of Patient Safety Events: Results from the National 
Medicare Patient Safety Monitoring System, 49 MED. CARE 504, 
508 tbl. 3 (2011). 
 39. See Robin D. Hanson, Showing That You Care: The 
Evolution of Health Altruism, 70 MED. HYPOTHESES 725, 728-30 
(2008). 
 40. ROBERT H. BROOK ET AL., RAND CORP., THE EFFECT OF COINSURANCE ON THE 
HEALTH OF ADULTS: RESULTS FROM THE RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT 1 
(1984), available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2006 
/R3055.pdf. 
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2,005 families to one of several insurance plans.41  
Some plans were more generous than others, and one 
plan offered free care.42  The study showed little 
to no benefit of free care besides lower blood 
pressure and getting corrective lenses to improve 
“far vision.”43  The beneficial effect for both 
measures was low.44  The other studies Hanson 
reviewed came to qualitatively similar results.  
Hanson says: “An optimistic accounting of the 
benefits of specific treatments attributes only 
five years of the 40 or more years of added 
lifespan over the last two centuries to 
medicine.”45  These studies may underestimate the 
importance of modern medicine in, for example, 
reducing the risks of childbirth.  Even here, 
however, there is some ambiguity about the 
relative importance of medical innovations such as 
forceps and non-medical factors such as improved 
diet.46  Overall, the evidence seems to support the 
view that Dr. Cole should be more skeptical about 
the relationship between medicine and health. 
Neither the general public nor anyone in 
particular chose the American medical system.  
Medical research is less hierarchical than Dr. 
Cole seems to suggest.  The hierarchy that does 
exist seems to have created a gap between the 
findings of the research elite and the clinical 
needs of practitioners and their patients.  The 
quality of research by the elite seems to be well 
below the standard Dr. Cole likely desires.  And 
modern medical practice may have much less to do 
with health outcomes than Dr. Cole seems to 
implicitly assume.  Overall, then, medicine may 
 
 41. See id. at 3-4. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. at 18-19. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Hanson, supra note 39, at 729 (citing John P. Bunker et 
al., Improving Health: Measuring Effects of Medical Care, 72 
MILBANK  Q. 225, 237-38 (1994)). 
 46. See Johanson et al., Has the Medicalisation of 
Childbirth Gone Too Far?, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 892, 892 (2002). 
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not represent an ideal for forensic science to 
emulate. 
II.  FORENSIC SCIENCE 
It is not a coincidence that the actually 
existing hierarchy in medicine turns out, upon 
examination, to be less attractive than Dr. Cole 
seems to believe.  I think Dr. Cole errs in trying 
to set up a system in which knowledge cascades 
downward from an elite.  I will risk caricaturing 
Dr. Cole’s position by characterizing it in plain 
terms.  Dr. Cole recognizes that bench examiners 
may be led astray by cognitive bias.  Bench 
examiners’ lack of rigorous scientific training 
compounds the problem when they invent techniques 
ad hoc, deviate from protocol, or otherwise exceed 
their competence.47  Dr. Cole wishes to fix the 
problem by creating an elite that will remove the 
exercise of discretion from the lower levels of 
the hierarchy.48  Stripped of their discretion, 
bench examiners will not be able to unconsciously 
skew results in accordance with the bench 
examiners’ cognitive biases.  Unfortunately, Dr. 
Cole does not consider who will capture this 
hypothetical National Institute of Forensic 
Science (NIFS).49  Nor does he recognize that the 
lower levels of the hierarchy, especially that of 
“technical management,” will have to exercise 
discretion, the knowledge hierarchy 
 
 47. See Cole, supra note 1, at 459 (citation omitted) 
(“[T]hey are often not trained to do basic research, lack the 
resources typically available to researchers at university, 
industrial, and government laboratories, and lack the 
professional networks basic researchers use to test their 
research and generate innovation.”). 
 48. See id. at 468-69 (“Researchers would have the last word 
on whether a method or technique is valid. Technicians would 
no longer be put in the awkward position of having to defend 
the validity of the techniques they apply.”). 
 49. The proposal for an NIFS was made in NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 19 
(2009), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/ 
printers/111th/111-28_49681.PDF. 
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notwithstanding.  Finally, Dr. Cole does not seem 
to have considered the possibility of creating a 
system of checks and balances in which one bias 
checks another. 
A. Who Will Capture NIFS? 
Dr. Cole says, “In proposing hierarchy, it 
should be noted that we are not proposing the 
creation of an elite ‘priesthood’ that would have 
a monopoly on the legitimation of knowledge.”50  He 
elaborates, “Basic Researchers would be expected 
to be a diverse group of scientists with diverse 
viewpoints, as medical researchers are today.”51  
And he compares NIFS to the National Institutes of 
Health or the Food and Drug Administration.52  As 
Ioannidis and others suggest, the viewpoints of 
medical researchers are not particularly diverse; 
research fashions come and go.53 
It matters, I think, just what role NIFS would 
play and just who would be acting in that role.  
Presumably, NIFS would be the main source of 
funding for research in forensic science.  If so, 
it is important to look into the incentives of 
NIFS officials.  Dr. Cole wants “diverse 
viewpoints,”54 but will NIFS deliver?  The results 
of NIFS-sponsored research would vary depending on 
who reviews grant proposals.  Imagine two 
scenarios.  First, imagine scientists, who agree 
with Budowle et al. that “[a] community-wide error 
rate is not meaningful,”55 dominate NIFS review 
panels.  Now imagine that scientists who agree 
with Dr. Cole dominate NIFS review panels.  In 
 
 50. Cole, supra note 1, at 469 (citation omitted). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See Ioannidis¸ supra note 29, at 0700. 
 54. See Cole, supra note 1, at 469 (“Basic Researchers would 
be expected to be a diverse group of scientists with diverse 
viewpoints, as medical researchers are today.”). 
 55. Bruce Budowle et al., A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and 
Interpretation in Forensic Sciences and Direction for 
Continuing Advancement, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 798, 801 (2009). 
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which scenario is research more likely to estimate 
error rates in forensic science?  The Dr. Budowle 
group and the Dr. Cole group would earnestly 
strive to uphold the highest scientific standards.  
Given their prior views, however, the two 
different groups will assess competing research 
proposals differently and the results of the 
process will differ radically.  Dr. Cole is right 
to extol “diverse viewpoints,” but it might be 
hard for a homogeneous group, be they Dr. Budowle 
disciples or Dr. Cole disciples, to avoid skewing 
research awards toward scholars and scientists who 
seem to be leaning in the same direction.  I 
appreciate Dr. Cole’s aversion to “an elite 
‘priesthood’ that would have a monopoly on the 
legitimation of knowledge,”56 but the very 
existence of NIFS would seem to create a 
substantial risk of creating such a priesthood. 
In part, I am raising the problem of regulatory 
capture.  Dr. Cole recognizes that “[i]f [NIFS] is 
‘captured’ by law enforcement, it becomes less 
obvious that it would be a force for improvement 
rather than stagnation.”57  He does not offer any 
suggestions, however, for avoiding this result. 
Regulatory and oversight bodies are supposed to 
constrain special interests and protect the 
general interest.  When regulatory and oversight 
bodies instead serve special interests, these 
bodies have been “captured.”  An industry must 
offer something in return if it is to capture a 
regulator.  The reciprocation may consist of 
campaign contributions to members of Congress who 
provide oversight of the regulatory body.  It may 
take any of an indefinitely large number of other 
forms.  Capture is the norm, unfortunately, which 
makes beneficial change hard.  The first great 
regulatory body in the U.S. was the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC), which was established 
in 1887 to control railroads.  The Interstate 
 
 56. Cole, supra note 1, at 469 (citation omitted). 
 57. Id. at 436. 
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Commerce Act prohibited price discrimination and 
required that “all charges . . . shall be 
reasonable and just.”58  This language seems to 
constrain the railroads, and yet the railroads 
supported the Act.59  Posner explains: “The 
railroads supported the enactment of the first 
Interstate Commerce Act, which was designed to 
prevent railroads from practicing price 
discrimination, because discrimination was 
undermining the railroads’ cartels.”60 
The interest that captures a regulator may not 
be the regulated industry. “Crudely put, the 
butter producers wish to suppress margarine and 
encourage the production of bread.”61  For example, 
the railroads sometimes used state regulators to 
suppress trucking.62  In the 1930s, “Texas and 
Louisiana placed a 7000-pound payload limit on 
trucks serving (and hence competing with) two or 
more railroad stations, and a 14,000-pound limit 
on trucks serving only one station (hence, not 
competing with it).”63 
The theory of supply and demand predicts that a 
commodity sold on a competitive market will end up 
in the hands of those who value it most, as 
measured by willingness to pay.  The theory does 
not tell us, however, who is willing to pay the 
most.  Similarly, the theory of regulatory capture 
does not tell us who will win in the contest of 
interests to capture a regulator.  It is a 
continuous fight; victory may be partial and 
fleeting.  Nevertheless, we can say that 
concentrated interests aid victory.  Well-
 
 58. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, § 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379 
(1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 
U.S.C.). 
 59. See Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 
5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 337 (1974). 
 60. See id. 
 61. George Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 6 (1971). 
 62. See id. at 8. 
 63. Id. 
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organized groups with relatively large and 
homogeneous interests have an advantage in the 
contest.  Considering who fits that bill for NIFS, 
the answer may be law enforcement.  According to 
Bureau of Labor Statistics data, in 2008 the 
number of police and detectives, corrections 
officers and jailers, first-line supervisors and 
managers of corrections officers, bailiffs, and 
probation officers was 1,505,200.64  These people 
are part of a relatively large, concentrated, 
well-organized, and homogeneous interest group.  
Is there any other interest group, such as the 
innocence movement,65 in a good position to compete 
with law enforcement?  And if so, for how long? 
B. Hierarchy Does Not Eliminate Discretion 
Dr. Cole’s appeal to hierarchy may have another 
limit.  As in medicine, there is a gap between the 
needs of practitioners and the general results 
produced by the knowledge elite.  In medicine, the 
patient may have unique or unusual combinations of 
characteristics, such as concurrent diseases.  In 
forensic science, the evidence may have unique or 
unusual combinations of characteristics, such as 
material substrates.  Thus, validation studies in 
fingerprint analysis may not help the bench 
examiner to evaluate a latent print deposited on 
wood grain or a pebbled lampshade.  The advocates 
of sequential unmasking recognized the importance 
of case specific judgment by separating the task 
of a case manager (a part of “technical 
 
 64. There were approximately 883,600 employed police and 
detectives in 2008. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL 
OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 2010-11 EDITION, BULLETIN 2800, 476 (2010), 
available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/oco2008.htm.  454,500 
were employed as jailers or correctional officers; 43,500 as 
first-line supervisors and managers thereof; and 20,200 as 
bailiffs in 2008. See id. at 469.  And, there were 103,400 
employed probation officers and correctional treatment 
officers in 2008. See id. at 243.  The sum of these numbers 
is 1,505,200. 
 65. See, e.g., INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject 
.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2011). 
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management,” presumably) from that of a bench 
examiner.66  Context information is not hidden from 
the case manager who determines what potentially 
biasing information is revealed to the bench 
examiner in what sequence.67  This separation of 
tasks may reduce the element of discretion in the 
work of bench examiners, though it will probably 
not eliminate it. 
To effect sequential unmasking and the 
separation of tasks between the case manager and 
the bench examiner requires the exercise of 
discretion by the case manager, whose job cannot 
be reduced to a routine.  I do not understand how 
increased hierarchy can solve the problems in 
forensic science when a crucial worker in the 
system, the case manager operating well below the 
level of Basic Research, must use judgment and 
discretion in her daily work.  Recall that Dr. 
Cole favors “a ‘hierarchical’ model in which a 
‘knowledge elite’ of researchers exerts control 
over practitioners.”68  But to exert control means 
to pre-decide, and thus, to eliminate judgment and 
discretion, and the infinite variety of case 
particulars prevents the elite from making all 
decisions in advance.  It therefore prevents the 
elite from exercising effective control over 
practitioners. 
 
 66. See Dan E. Krane et al., Letter to the Editor: 
Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects 
in Forensic DNA Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006, 1006 
(2008), available at http://www.bioforensics.com/sequential_ 
unmasking/ (“A simple protocol would dictate a separation of 
tasks between a qualified individual familiar with case 
information (a case manager) and an analyst from whom domain-
irrelevant information is masked.”). 
 67. See id.; D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho 
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden 
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 
35-38 (2002). 
 68. Cole, supra note 1, at 468. 
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C. Why Not Leverage Bias? 
Dr. Cole does not discuss the possibility of 
leveraging bias to achieve more satisfactory 
results by strengthening the defense right to 
expertise.69  A defense right to forensic expertise 
is the single best way to reduce the incidence of 
false and misleading forensic science testimony.  
E. James Cowan and I explain why competition 
between “strongly opposed” experts tends to 
improve the quality of information they provide to 
third parties such as juries.70  “If the interests 
of the competing information suppliers are 
strongly opposed then one of them always has an 
incentive to provide additional information.”71  If 
some bit of relevant information has not been 
revealed, then, by virtue of the fact that it is 
relevant, it will help one side or the other.  
Accordingly, one side or the other will have an 
incentive to reveal it.72  This logic works even if 
both sides are biased.  It requires only that 
their interests in the case be strongly opposed.  
Thus, the adversarial system of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence allows for pitting one bias against 
another to produce results that more closely 
resemble the consequences of unbiased analysis.  
Although it is important to attempt to reduce bias 
by measures such as sequential unmasking, all such 
measures are incomplete.  The remaining biases 
 
 69. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to 
Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1305, 1358 (2004) (“Under a Sixth Amendment theory, an 
expert should be appointed whenever necessary for counsel to 
render effective assistance ‘whenever the [expert] services 
are necessary to the preparation and presentation of an 
adequate defense.’”) (footnote omitted) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 70. See Roger Koppl & E. James Cowan, A Battle of Forensic 
Experts Is Not a Race to the Bottom, 22 REV. POL. ECON. 235, 
253 (2010) (citing Milgrom & Roberts, Relying on the 
Information of Interested Parties, 17 RAND J. ECON. 18, 25, 26 
(1986)). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
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should also be leveraged by pitting one expert 
against the other.  We need checks and balances.  
The existence of defense experts in forensic 
science would also create a self-renewing 
foundation for continuous improvement in forensic 
science.  Many reforms do not stick.  A new reform 
is generally effective only when it is first 
applied, and perhaps not even then.  If the reform 
works initially, it is because the affected 
parties have no coping strategies.  Over time, 
however, those affected parties learn compensating 
strategies and the reform loses its beneficial 
effects.  The reform does not stick.  For example, 
affected parties may capture an oversight body.  A 
body of scientific experts similar to public 
defenders and allied with them would, however, act 
to preserve its own existence in much the way that 
public defenders are unlikely to be subverted from 
their adversarial role.  The reform creating such 
a group is, therefore, a self-sticking reform.  
The reform creates an organized body of persons 
with a direct interest in maintaining the reform.  
Once this reform is in place, each criminal case 
will have two forensic experts with strongly 
opposed interests.  Each side will have an 
incentive to document the upstream deficiencies of 
the system and bring them to the attention of the 
court whenever that is strategically appropriate.  
In this way, competing forensic experts become the 
central self-regulatory element of the system.  
Such a reform would be truly transformative of the 
criminal justice system in America. 
In an earlier article, I have suggested a suite 
of reforms that would make forensic science a 
self-governing system that reduces bias through 
measures such as sequential unmasking, but also 
leverages biases through competing experts.73  
Redundancy is an essential feature of my 
 
 73. See generally Roger Koppl, How to Improve Forensic 
Science, 20 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 255 (2005). 
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proposal.74  Unfortunately, I cannot expand on the 
important principle of redundancy in this already 
lengthy Response. 
III.  TWO PATHS FORWARD 
The subtitle of the 2009 National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) report was A PATH FORWARD.75  In 
recommending oversight through NIFS the report did 
reveal a path forward.  It revealed the path of 
oversight, command, and control.76  But there is a 
second path neglected by both the authors of the 
NAS report and Dr. Cole.  That is the path of 
checks and balances, the path that leverages the 
biases and infirmities of the real human actors in 
the system to generate results that are better 
than the results any one person could have 
produced. 
Discovery science is such a system.  Discovery 
science advances by the rivalry of theories, 
schools, and individual personalities.  Every 
physicist since Galileo and before has had his or 
her personal limits, quirks, and intellectual 
prejudices.  And yet the corpus of physical theory 
is one of the greatest achievements of the human 
intellect.  The system is better than any of its 
parts.  The forensic science community should seek 
out ways to make the social structure of forensic 
science more nearly resemble the social structure 
of discovery science, rather than the questionable 
social structure of medicine.  Command and control 
systems of the sort Dr. Cole recommends are 
vulnerable to take-over by elites that may 
represent narrow interests or simply lack the 
talents required to make the system work well.  No 
matter who runs the show, command and control 
systems cannot be better than the elites that 
control those systems, and may be a good deal 
 
 74. See id. at 467-69. 
 75. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 49. 
 76. See id. at 78-79. 
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worse.  We should think more about the path not 
taken by the NAS. 
